Leadership: "The Lost Bomb" Revisited

Antitool called the other night, and we had a pleasant discussion on a variety of topics:  Palestine, work, books, beer, and a revisit of the August nuclear warhead debacle, despite the fact I have the phone personality of an antique bronze bookend--I don't converse well when I can't see someone's face (but I digress).

I've learned a few things since the incident, notably I know two of the relieved senior officers:  Col Emig and Col Westhauser.  The sorry fact of commissioned services is the extra pay and benefits comes with a Damocles sword.  That is, when you command, you take all the praise when the unit does well... and you get fired when the unit performs poorly, whether or not you had any culpability.

Both Colonels are sharp officers:  smart, gregarious, arguably destined for great things.  Hence their selections for command billets.  Unfortunately, Col Emig was the commander of Minot AFB for a mere 2 months before the nuke event.  He'd barely had time to hang bling in his office, visit all the units, and inspect their programs.  But that doesn't matter when you command, and needless to say, with an event as big as loose nukes heads were expected to roll.

Thus comes the sudden and violent end to an otherwise splendid military career.

Or is it?

After I got off the horn with Antitool I got curious about the fallout (pardon the pun), so I ran a search on "Emig" and found a recent update on Minot's former senior leadership's whereabouts:

"Where Are They Now," at In from the Cold
EXCERPT:  Three months after their dismissal, three Colonels who lost their jobs as a result of the mishap have settled into new assignments. Their latest postings speak volumes about how the Air Force handles the "firing" of senior officers, their potential for rehabilitation, and who is considered most responsible for the Minot incident.

Interesting read, although I wish there was more source documentation.  But if true, it looks like the only head still rolling is that of the former Maintenance Group Commander.  She's the one stuck in a "career killer" job, while those of Col Emig and Westhauser still have a ring of "hooah" to them.

The authors highlight how both Emig and Westhauser are accused of being "ringknockers;" that is, US Air Force Academy grads being given a second chance by the USAFA good ol' boy network.  I don't buy it:  once again, Emig was so new at the job you could still smell the plastic wrapping on him.  Based on knowing the guy I'd be inclined to give him a second chance, too.

But What about the MXG/CC, Col Lundell?  She was new, too, so where's her sexy rehabilitation job? 

It goes back to culpability:  the training that would've thwarted the fiasco was owned by the Maintenance Group, so the heat lamp's pointed right at her. So either she really doesn't deserve another go (which I doubt), or no higher ups have the balls to give her a chance given the seriousness of the event, her close proximity to the issue relative to the other leaders, and thus the questions other officers would raise if she were given command again.

Then again, the Operations Group isn't without fault, either:  with the limited public knowledge available I'm left scratching my head on how the pilots failed to notice.

To further ape the article, I'm also wondering where the noncommissioned leadership was in all this?  I understand the duties and responsibilities of the sergeants, having been a proud member of the NCO corps myself.  In short, officers command the military, but the NCOs--the backbone of the military--run things.  All the training and accountability rests on the shoulders of young junior sergeants, and the good senior sergeants regularly thrash the officer corps should they get too stupid. 

Somewhere in this instance training and accountability failed; and in the military, even a minor oversight carries potentially serious consequences.

Ultimately, there's simply not enough information at the public level to know where the blame really belongs, nor is there enough to judge who deserves a second chance.  In my mind, though, if the above leaders where good enough to command in the first place, than perhaps they deserve a re-look.  Use this instance as a positive training reinforcement for the leadership at all levels rather than just another "first strike and you're out" example.

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Comments

[MOGS]

Hmmm, where's the NCO's? Consider this...

http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2008/01/airforce_whistleblower_lucero_080117w/

[Violence Worker]

First of all, I'm not sure maintenance screwed up.

Flying schedules are developed monthly, revised weekly and even hourly if need be. The flying schedule is something developed by ops and maintenance. Ops has their training and real world missions and Maintenance has to come up with the airplanes, properly configured, to meet those obligations.

The Crew Chief and aircraft maintenance have little to do with weapons configuration. That is the primary job of ops and Munitions Maintenance. All the crew dog does is get it ready to fly. He or she will make sure all required maintenance is done and signed off. The payload is decided by folks with a whole lot more horsepower then some Staff Sergeant crew chief.

I'm guessing that the airplane was loaded and configured at some point to meet a mission commitment. Munitions loaders just don't sashay up to the Nuclear weapons storage facility and checkout a few nukes without a whole bunch of folks signing off on it. Now here's the rub. If the mission had changed prior to flight and the loaders didn't reconfig the plane, then someone goofed. However, it's highly doubtful that someone would have made the necessary notations saying the nukes were gone in the aircraft forms without removing the weapons. That boggles the mind.

The flight crew is required to preflight the airplane. Part of that preflight is to go over every page in those aircraft forms. The navigation team (one of whom is the bomb dropper (or Radar-Navigator)is required to personally inspect the weapons bay to verify the airplane is correctly configured per the aircraft forms. (I double checked this with a friend who is a former Radar-Nav) The crew knows their mission and how the plane is supposed to be configured. Nukes are marked. Dummy nukes are also marked as dummies so that it is readily recognizable. I'm not sure, but I think there are supposed to be electronic indications that live nukes are on board.

The two man program and the PRP program is, or was serious business. It begs the question as to where were the cops were. I NEVER saw a nuke without more guns around it then maintainers.

I worked in the 43rd Munitions Maintenance Squadron on Anderson AFB, GU. Our facility was beside the Nuke plant. I saw the convoys go out to the flightline and return. Me and a coworker changed a tire on a piece of Munitions Handling Equipment with a live clip. It's a funny feeling working with a bunch of cops with loaded weapons watching your every move.

So where was security in all of this? Did they have live nukes sitting unguarded on the flightline?

I don't know if it was right to fire the wing commander with only a short amount of time on the job but someone was gonna fall on a sword. On the other hand, the previous wing commander should have a whole lot of splainin' to do. There are systemic failures in that whole program from security to Ops and to munitions maintenance. That flight crew has a whole lot to answer for as well.

In the end, I've always been told that the pilot is ultimately responsible knowing what is on his airplane. If there is an NCO that allowed this to happen, then he should be court-martialed. Me thinks it is a lot higher up than some harried MSgt though.

VW

[Rosemary]

I'm a little confused. What bomb got lost? I haven't read about it yet, so I'm kind of in the dark. Thanks.

[The Mad Pigeon]

Rosemary - Back in August live nuclear warheads were accidentally flown from Minot AFB to Barksdale AFB:

http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/09/marine_nuclear_B52_070904w/

[MOGS]

"I don't know if it was right to fire the wing commander with only a short amount of time on the job but someone was gonna fall on a sword. On the other hand, the previous wing commander should have a whole lot of splainin' to do. There are systemic failures in that whole program from security to Ops and to munitions maintenance. That flight crew has a whole lot to answer for as well."

Shack! I think it's tough for anybody who's supposed to be in charge to uncover all the problems and issues bubbling beneath the surface of his command in two months or so, so I don't know if firing the wing king was anything more than following the ritual laid down by St Le May all those years ago in SAC, but I do have to ask - if there were problems that big, shouldn't he have gotten some sort of inkling even in that short period of time? It's not like new wing kings just magically appear out of nowhere one day, with no turnover, or prep, or anything like that? I don't know, I wasn't there, and part of me thinks the man got a raw deal.

On the other hand, I do think someone needs to look at the previous generation of leadership a little bit and see what's up.

And VW I agree, that if there was a failure of NCO leadership, it was probably above the MSgt level. If my experience has taught me anything, it's that the Top 3 can be the best godsend in your unit, or your worst nightmare. There is a world of difference between a Chief and an E-9.

I've taken to calling the sometimes misplaced mystique the "Cult of the Chief" - sometimes it's deserved, sometimes it is clearly not.

There, now that I've gone and pissed off any and all senior enlisted and retired readers of the Pigeons, I am now open to your rebuttals, spears, and critiques.

MOGS

[Ed]

ehh, still not convinced it was an accident. i think it was a hushhush job, but somebody voiced out because he had a moment of clarity. the other guys involved all signed an NDA and saw what happened to their buddies who hesitated and decided they better stay hushed up, else suffer similar, logical and plausible, fates, for saying anything. dead men tell no tales.